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COMMENTS
THE EXCLUSIONARY EFFECT OF
"MANSIONIZATION": AREA VARIANCES
UNDERMINE EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HOUSING
AFFORDABILITY
Catherine Durkin'
Home ownership near the workplace has become unattainable' for
many working Americans. Despite the overall increase in national
home-ownership rates,3 according to the Urban Land Institute, "[a] rapid
population rise and stagnating salaries for the middle class have made
workforce housing a national problem., 4 "The Department of Housing
and Urban Development [(HUD)] defines 'affordable housing' as a
home which costs less than 30% of a family's income . . ."' In 1999, one
out of every nine households in the nation spent more than half its
' B.A., History, Boston College, 1999; J.D. Candidate May 2006, The Catholic University
of America, Columbus School of Law. The author wishes to thank Professor Helen
Alvard for her insight, and the dedicated editors and staff of the Catholic University Law
Review for their time and effort. In addition, the author thanks her family, particularly
Mary Kay and Ralph Terceira and Jim and Pat Durkin, for their support, and James
Hurley for his sustained encouragement.
1. Childs Walker, For Many in Middle Class, Home Isn't Where the Job Is, BALT.
SUN, Mar. 31, 2004, at 1A.
2. See, e.g., Brigid Schulte, For a Lucky Few, A Wooded Oasis, WASH. POST, Feb. 6,
2003, § MS (Montgomery), at 14; Squeezed Out, ECONOMIST, July 22, 2000, at 33
(commenting on Bay Area nurses who went on strike "to demand wages that would allow
them to live closer to where they worked, rather than enduring a commute of several
hours" and noting that "[a] quarter of the positions in the Los Altos police force are empty
because officers, unable to live near the town, have resigned, and the force expect[ed] to
be down to half strength" within three months).
3. The Roof That Costs Too Much, ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 2002, at 34 ("Two in three
homes are owned by their occupants, and the lowest mortgage rates in three decades keep
the numbers rising.").
4. Walker, supra note 1; see also John K. Mcllwain, Show Me the Money: A
Proposed Federal Response to Urban Sprawl, 11 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 26, 26 (2001); Carol A. Bell, Workforce Housing: The New
Economic Imperative?, HOUSING FACTS & FINDINGS (Fannie Mae Found., Wash., D.C.),
Vol.4, No.2, 2002, at 3-4, available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hff/
pdf/HFF v4i2.pdf (examining the workforce housing problem briefly but thoroughly).
5. The Roof That Costs Too Much, supra note 3, at 34.
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income on housing.6 Since then, in Montgomery County, Maryland,
which has been widely acknowledged for its efforts to address affordable
housing concerns,7 "[tihe average sale price for a home has increased by
54 percent in the past five years, while the income level rose only 14
percent."" Although a resident of Montgomery County, Maryland, must
earn a minimum of $48,700 annually to afford the monthly payment on a
median-cost home, twenty percent of Montgomery County residents earn
$35,000 or less.9  Since the mid-1990s, national house prices have
increased by thirty percent, which is the biggest increase in house prices
during a similar time period in history.0 As a result, "'[f]irst-time home
ownership opportunities are disappearing"'11 and not just for the
"familiar poor,"1 2 but for families who are making at least fifty percent of
6. MILLENNIAL HOUS. COMM'N, MEETING OUR NATION'S HOUSING
CHALLENGES: REPORT OF THE BIPARTISAN MILLENNIAL HOUSING COMMISSION 14
(2002); see also Castles in Hot Air, ECONOMIST, May 31, 2003, at 8, 9 (reporting that the
average house price to median income ratio in the United States was then "at a record
high" up by fourteen percent over the long-term average).
7. See Thomas A. Brown, Democratizing the American Dream: The Role of a
Regional Housing Legislature in the Production of Affordable Housing, 37 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 599, 632 (2004) ("Montgomery County, Maryland has enacted what may be the
most successful program to create affordable housing in the country." (footnote omitted));
Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Affordable Housing: Can NIMBYism Be Transformed Into
OKIMBYism?, in REPRESENTING THE POOR AND HOMELESS: INNOVATIONS IN
ADVOCACY 89, 93 (Sidney D. Watson ed., 2001), available at http://www.abanet.
org/homeless/RepresentingThePoorandHomeless.pdf ("The Montgomery County
[Moderately Priced Development Unit] program is cited frequently as an example of what
courageous and imaginative people can accomplish."); Jeff Barker, Affluent Montgomery's
Success Breeds a 'Dire' Housing Crunch, BALT. SUN, Oct. 13, 2003, at 1A ("For years,
Montgomery County had one of the nation's most progressive-and widely copied-
affordable housing programs.").
8. Kelly Smith, County Seeks Solutions to Affordable Housing Shortage,
MONTGOMERY J. (Rockville, Md.), Mar. 23, 2004, http://hocmc.org/AHC/2004journal
article.htm. "[H]ouse prices have [also] been jumping ahead of incomes in most of
America's big cities .... Eight of the 50 biggest metropolitan areas have seen prices rise
by nearly a third in real terms" between 1997 and 2002. The Roof That Costs Too Much,
supra note 3, at 34.
9. Barker, supra note 7.
10. House of Cards, ECONOMIST, May 31, 2003, at 3, 4.
11. Barker, supra note 7 (quoting Robert Goldman, President of Montgomery
Housing Partnership, Inc.).
12. The Roof That Costs Too Much, supra note 3; see also McIlwain, supra note 4, at
30-32 (describing the national workforce housing crisis). The United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has defined a family with a "critical housing
need" as one who "spends more than 50 percent of its income on housing, or lives in a
severely inadequate unit." Id. at 30. In 1997, over three million full-time workforce
families who "do not fit the stereotype of families that cannot get decent, affordable
housing" met these criteria. Id. By 1999, this number increased to 3.7 million. Id.
[Vol. 55:439
The Exclusionary Effect of "Mansionization"
the national median income, who do not qualify for federal housing
assistance.13
The traditional American attitude toward land use and planning has
been a primary culprit in the present affordable housing shortage.14
Historically, "we have always had large areas of undeveloped land. We
have been able to use land until it is worn out, or no longer needed for its
current use, and just move on."' 5 However, the reality of our changed
circumstances has forced people to pay more attention to sustainable
growth strategies and local, as well as regional, community planning. 6
The shortage of affordable housing for moderate-income Americans has
produced a number of negative results: it impedes a healthy economy,"
13. Mcllwain, supra note 4, at 30; see also Castles in Hot Air, supra note 6, at 10
("[F]irst-time buyers are now finding it impossible to get on the bottom rung of the
property ladder because they cannot scrape together the deposit.").
14. Mcllwain, supra note 4, at 28. The author compares the American mindset:
[M]any Americans consider land a free-market commodity in plentiful supply.
They believe that a property owner's right to freely buy, sell, or develop land is
sacred-no matter where the land is located, what its natural features are, or
what impact its development might have on the environment, on other
properties, or on the community at large. Citing constitutional law to back them
up, landowners especially resist the idea of government deciding whose
properties can and cannot be developed.
to that of the Germans:
"No matter who owns it, Germans perceive land as a vital part of their collective
patrimony and finite in supply. They also understand that the economic value of
urban land is created in part by the public, not by property owners and
developers, through the acts of planning, zoning and infrastructure investment.
Accordingly, Germans believe that it is reasonable for them and their
government to have a strong say in how land is treated."
Id. (quoting Roger Lewis, Urban Planning: It's Time for a Foreign Concept To Hit Home
in the US, WASH. POST, June 28, 2001 at H3).
15. Id.
16. See David L. Callies, The Quiet Revolution Revisited: A Quarter Century of
Progress, 26 URB. LAW. 197, 197 (1994) (noting a change in the concept of land "from a
commodity only to both a resource and a commodity"); Tim Iglesias, Housing Impact
Assessments: Opening New Doors For State Housing Regulation While Localism Persists,
82 OR. L. REV 433, 452 n.71 (2003) (explaining that the term "Quiet Revolution" refers to
a general trend toward states reasserting their authority over local governments' exercise
of power).
17. See, e.g., MILLENNIAL HOUS. COMM'N, supra note 6, at 10; The Sun Also Sets,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 2004, at 67, 68 (warning that the overvaluation of home prices in
the United States and the pricing-out of first time-buyers may lead to a stall or fall in the
housing market, which could "trigger a sharp slowdown in consumer spending" and
negatively impact the economy).
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threatens the family unit,18 strains local infrastructures, 9 burdens the
environment," and harms the quality of life." Communities "need a
mixture of people in order to function, including manual labourers,
police, nurses and teachers" and therefore need a mixture of housing to
accommodate them.22
Various state, federal, local, and private entities have responded to the
growing shortage of affordable housing.23 Such responses have been
diverse in substance and procedure, but are insufficient to meet current
24
needs. The responses are insufficient because they focus exclusively on
the large-scale development of new affordable housing, while ignoring
the possibility of using area variances in built-up areas in ways that make
workforce housing affordability increasingly unlikely.25 The tendency to
demolish existing affordable housing units in inner suburban areas and
replace them with luxury-style housing, referred to in the press as
"mansionization,, 26 is undermining the effectiveness of the various
affordable housing responses discussed below.
This Comment addresses the potential impact of the area variance on
housing affordability for the working class (workforce housing) 27 in the
context of home ownership. Part I discusses the police power over
making land-use regulations, and the circumstances under which that
power is limited. It then documents the various ways courts, legislatures,
and local governments have tried to prevent communities from making
regulations that exclude certain socioeconomic classes from living there.
18. See, e.g., Melinda Westbrook, Connecticut's New Affordable Housing Appeals
Procedure: Assaulting the Presumptive Validity of Land Use Decisions, 66 CONN. B.J. 169,
170 (1992) (explaining that adults are being priced out of the communities in which they
grew up as children); Walker, supra note 1 (noting that families are often separated by
counties and states as a result of high prices).
19. See, e.g., Jim Patterson, Gimmie Shelter from the Storm, SANTA LUCIAN (Santa
Lucia Chapter of the Sierra Club, San Luis Obispo, Cal.) July/Aug. 2004, at 1, 1,
http://santalucia.sierraclub.org/lucian/santalucian__julyaug04.pdf.
20. See, e.g., id.
21. See, e.g., id.; New Ranking Names America's Cough and Cold Capitals, DRUG
WEEK (NewsRx, Atlanta, Ga.), Nov. 5, 2004, 2004 WLNR 3210090 (reporting that the
stress of long daily commutes in the car weakens the immune system, leaving people
susceptible to illness).
22. Squeezed Out, supra note 2, at 33.
23. See infra Part I.B.2.
24. See discussion infra Parts IV.A-B.
25. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
26. See, e.g., Annie Gowen, Arlington Downsizing McMansion Aspirations, WASH.
POST, Feb. 17, 2004, at B1.
27. Mcllwain, supra note 4, at 30 (defining workforce housing as private "housing
that is affordable to moderate-income working families ... making between 50 percent
and 120 percent of median income"). Full discussions of low-income housing, public
housing, and rental housing are beyond the scope of this Comment.
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Part II identifies the extent of the federal government's role in
facilitating affordable housing. Part III examines how local authorities
can use their power to make exceptions to land-use regulations,
particularly exceptions to size and height requirements, in ways that
reduce the availability of affordable housing. Part IV analyzes the
effectiveness of various legal responses to the workforce housing
shortage. Part V proposes that such responses could have a more
complete effect if they are applied to the procedure for granting area
variances. This Comment concludes that this measure is necessary to
stop the practice of mansionization, which undermines the various
affordable housing efforts.
I. ZONING: THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF ZONING
A. Traditional Euclidian Zoning
The Supreme Court first recognized the power of a government to
control land use by zoning as part of the government's general,
constitutionally-guaranteed police powers to regulate according to the
health, safety, morals, or general welfare 28 in 1926 in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co. 29  In Euclid, the Supreme Court held that local
governments have broad discretion over land-use decisions as long as
they zone pursuant to their state's zoning enabling act, the means by
which state legislatures confer zoning power on local governments, 30 and
conform to constitutional principles.3' Furthermore, Euclid established a
presumption of validity in favor of the local government when plaintiffs
28. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("[P]owers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people."). Supreme Court case law has always recognized the state police power,
see, e.g., Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 523-24 (1847); Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 443 (1827); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
78-79 (1824), but courts have broadened the precise scope of the police power over time,
see, e.g., Santa Fe Cmty. Sch. v. N.M. State Bd. of Educ., 518 P.2d 272, 273 (N.M. 1974).
Historically, states used the police power to promote their interests in the health, safety,
and morals of their citizens, see, e.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885); Beer Co.
v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1877); R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1877); Miller
v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 234 P. 381, 383 (Cal. 1925), but their use of the police power has
grown to include their interest in general public welfare, see, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424 (1952); Noble
State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 amended by 219 U.S. 575 (1911).
29. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
30. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1649-50 (8th ed. 2004).
31. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 389, 395-97 (explaining that the suburb in this case "is
politically a separate municipality, with powers of its own and authority to govern itself as
it sees fit" within the limits of state, federal, and constitutional law, and concluding that
separating types of land use from one another was a proper exercise of such power).
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challenge its authority over land use through litigation.32 The burden is
thus on the challenger to establish that a zoning regulation is invalid.33 In
the affordable housing context, it is nearly impossible for challengers of
zoning regulations to meet this burden.3
B. Zoning and Discrimination: "Exclusionary Zoning"
1. Scope of Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Housing Discrimination:
When Do Zoning Regulations Become Improper Exercises of Police
Power?
Supreme Court case law on housing discrimination has suggested that
a local government's zoning decision to block new construction of
workforce housing is within its legitimate police powers. 5 Euclid held
that a local government's land-use decision is only an abuse of its police
powers if it violates state law or the state constitution.36 Later decisions
have established that local land-use decisions must also comply with the
United States Constitution.37 For example, the Court applies a higher
level of scrutiny when zoning ordinances infringe on another
constitutionally guaranteed protection, such as substantive or proceduraldepoes38 oreul • 39
due process, or equal protection. However, the Supreme Court hasheld that there is no constitutional right, fundamental or otherwise, to
32. Id. at 388 ("If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be
fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control." (citing Radice v.
New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1924)); see also Westbrook, supra note 18, at 187 (discussing
how the presumption of validity of local land-use decisions set forth in Euclid has
undermined the promotion and construction of affordable housing).
33. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395.
34. See, e.g., id. (applying rational basis scrutiny to determine whether the zoning
ordinance was unconstitutional); Knight v. Tape, Inc., 935 F.2d 617, 627 (3d Cir. 1991)
("[T]he minimum rationality standard is an extremely difficult one.., to meet.").
35. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388 ("[T]he question whether the power exists to forbid the
erection of a building of a particular kind or for a particular use ... is to be determined ...
by considering it in connection with the circumstances and the locality."). In dicta, the
Euclid Court suggested that protecting "favored localities" from added density was
rationally a legitimate use of zoning power. [d. at 394-95; see also Vill. of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (holding that maintaining "a quiet place where yards are wide,
people few, and motor vehicles restricted" is a legitimate, permissible, police-power
interest).
36. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 389.
37. See infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494. 499 (1977); Nectow v. City
of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928).
39. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-
66 (1977).
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affordable housing.0 Although a zoning ordinance that infringes on a
fundamental right is an unconstitutional violation of substantive due
process,4' a zoning ordinance that deprives citizens of affordable housing
is not and would thus be upheld as a legitimate exercise of police power.42
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that economic status is not a
"suspect" classification.43  As such, although discriminatory intent to
exclude a suspect class-for example, a racial minority-
unconstitutionally violates equal protection," a zoning ordinance that
excludes based on economic status should withstand an equal protection
analysis. 45 A zoning ordinance that excludes based on economic status is
described as "exclusionary.
46
Within these basic parameters, subtle distinctions between who a
zoning ordinance excludes have triggered different constitutional tests
40. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) ("We do not denigrate the
importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide
judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that
document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality . .
41. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499.
42. Cf. id. (explaining that a higher level of scrutiny was appropriate in Moore only
because the contested ordinance infringed on "'one of the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"'(quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974))).
43. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
44. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265 (requiring proof that discrimination
motivated the zoning decision as distinguished from a decision's merely discriminatory
effect, and describing the kind of proof that would be sufficient to overturn the
ordinance).
45. John J. Delaney, Addressing the Workforce Housing Crisis in Maryland and
Throughout the Nation: Do Land Use Regulations that Preclude Reasonable Housing
Opportunity Based upon Income Violate the Individual Liberties Protected by State
Constitutions?, 33 U. BALT. L. REV. 153, 186-87 (2004).
For all practical purposes, an intent test, such as that in Arlington Heights,
makes it virtually impossible to prove a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
because the local government can always cite a valid police power reason for its
action....
Respected commentators have interpreted Arlington Heights as an "implicit
endorsement of economic exclusionary zoning."
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LAND USE 498 (3d ed. 1999)).
46. JAMES A. COON & SHELDON W. DAMSKY, ALL You EVER WANTED TO KNOW
ABOUT ZONING... 193 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2d ed. 1993). The authors quote a helpful
definition of exclusionary zoning: "'Exclusionary zoning may occur either because the
municipality has limited the permissible uses within a community to exclude certain
groups or has imposed restrictions so stringent that their practical effect is to prevent all
but the wealthy from living there."' Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Asian Ams. for Equal.
v. Koch, 527 N.E.2d 265, 271 (N.Y. 1988)); see also Westbrook, supra note 18, at 173
(providing "large-lot zoning or restrictions on multi-family housing" as examples of
exclusionary zoning practices).
2006]
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and have produced different constitutional outcomes.4 ' For example, the
Supreme Court applied a strict-scrutiny analysis to overturn a zoning
ordinance that affected the housing rights of a family,48 and a rational-
basis analysis to overturn a zoning ordinance that affected the housing
rights of the mentally retarded.49  In contrast, but yet consistent with
Euclid,50 the Court applied a rational-basis test to uphold a zoning
ordinance that affected the housing rights of students sharing a
dwelling." A rational-basis test requires only that the ordinance be
somehow reasonably related to the public welfare," and allows
communities to "use seemingly legitimate land use concerns as pretexts
for denying [affordable housing] projects and then enter court on appeal
with a presumption of validity in their favor.
53
Although an equal protection challenge to a zoning ordinance requires
proof of discriminatory intent,54 under the Fair Housing Act (FHA),55
"significant" discriminatory impact is often sufficient to invalidate a
zoning ordinance in the absence of proof of discriminatory intent.56 The
FHA, however, "only applies to those individuals who are part of a
protected class and does not cover those who are denied access to
47. Compare Viii. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1974), with City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
48. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (noting that "[w]hen a
city undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family, neither Belle Terre nor Euclid
governs; the usual judicial deference to the legislature is inappropriate" because the
freedom to make decisions about family life is considered a fundamental right).
49. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448 (holding that an ordinance requiring a special use
permit for a group home for the mentally retarded failed rational basis scrutiny because it
was applied to further irrational fears of a certain group, rather than a legitimate state
interest, and insisting that "mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors
which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding are not permissible bases for
treating a [group] home . . . differently"); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that closer scrutiny of a police-power regulation is
required when it has a prejudicial effect on a suspect class).
50. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
51. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 8-9 (lamenting that "every line drawn by a legislature
leaves some out that might well have been included [but] [t]hat [is an] exercise of
discretion ... [which] is a legislative, not a judicial, function" (footnote omitted)).
52. Id. at 8.
53. Westbrook, supra note 18, at 187 (discussing how the deference articulated in
Euclid has facilitated economic exclusionary zoning).
54. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (2000).
56. See, e.g., Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56
F.3d 1243, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 1995); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington,
844 F.2d 926, 937 (2d Cir.), affd per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (holding that zoning
requirements are not "automatically" valid where they have "significant disparate
effects").
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housing based solely upon their economic status."57 Accordingly, under
the FHA, a court will only overturn a zoning ordinance that excludes
based on economic status if it is coupled with a discriminatory impact on
one of the protected classes-for example, a racial minority.58
2. Inclusionary/"Fair-Share" Approaches
Even without a Supreme Court mandate, state legislatures, state
courts, local governments, and private citizens have addressed the
problem of exclusionary zoning on their own.5 9 The various methods by
which they have done so-"inclusionary" methods-"[attempt] to create
more balance in the private housing market by ensuring a better mix of
housing types and price ranges." 6
(a) Judicial Initiatives and the Fair-Share Doctrine
Although the Supreme Court has not declared that economicS - 61
exclusionary zoning is unconstitutional, some state courts have
interpreted economic exclusionary zoning as a violation of their state
62
constitutions' equal protection and general welfare clauses. Where a
zoning decision goes too far in pursuit of other interests-such as
elevating property values-at the expense of affordable housing, some
state courts have required that municipalities adhere to the fair-share
doctrine, which requires them to make zoning regulations that
accommodate economically diverse housing needs.63
57. Delaney, supra note 45, at 200. The classes protected by the FHA are "race,
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d).
58. See Westbrook, supra note 18, at 174 & n.32.
59. See infra Parts I.B.2.a-d.
60. ERIC DAMIAN KELLY & BARBARA BECKER, COMMUNITY PLANNING 377
(2000).
61. See supra notes 40, 43 and accompanying text.
62. Delaney, supra note 45, at 192.
63. See, e.g., Builders Serv. Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 545 A.2d 530, 546
(Conn. 1988); Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 495 (N.H. 1991); S. Burlington
County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 11), 456 A.2d 390, 421-22 (N.J.
1983); S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 1), 336 A.2d
713, 731 (N.J. 1975), rev'd, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983); cf. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926) (hinting that its deferential approach may not apply to "cases
where the general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality").
See generally John M. Payne, Rethinking Fair Share: The Judicial Enforcement of
Affordable Housing Policies, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 20, 44 (1987) (critiquing the Mount Laurel
I and Mount Laurel It decisions, exposing the core dilemma of the fair-share approach by
explaining that "[oln the one hand, it is clear that little consideration of lower-income land
use concerns will occur without judicial intervention[, but] [o]n the other hand, affirmative
judicial intervention in the land use control process has seemed to violate the limits of
judicial legitimacy," and suggesting ways the doctrine can be reformed into a more
workable policy to promote affordable housing). Many state zoning enabling acts and
2006]
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Southern Burlington NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount
Laurel 1)64 is the most notorious example of a court imposing the fair-
share doctrine on its local government. 6 The issue in Mount Laurel I was
whether the exclusionary zoning practice of prohibiting the development
of multi-family housing was justified as being "in the best present and
future fiscal interest of the municipality and its inhabitants." 66 The New
Jersey Supreme Court held that the municipality's zoning ordinance
violated the state's constitution because it prevented a realistic
opportunity for its fair share of the region's low to moderate income
citizens to afford housing.67 Its rationale was that a "zoning regulation,
like any police power enactment, must promote public health, safety,
morals or the general welfare, '" 8 meaning the general welfare of the
entire state.69 Because the state confers its police power to zone on a
local government, a local government must use it to benefit "the welfare
of the citizens beyond the borders of the particular municipality.,
70
Mount Laurel I departed from Euclid by imposing an affirmative duty on
local governments to provide access to housing for all socioeconomic
classes rather than permitting them to make purely fiscal zoning
decisions at the expense of their citizens' access to affordable housing.71
The Mount Laurel I holding proved difficult to apply in practice, and
sparked "debates over [the meaning of] a 'developing community,' . . .
'realistic opportunity' for affordable housing, and.., a 'community's fair
share.' 72 After eight years, during which time the state made little
progress in changing its exclusionary practices, the New Jersey
local municipalities' zoning ordinances have incorporated the fair-share doctrine as part of
their comprehensive plans for managing growth. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD.,
CODE §§ 25A-2(5), -5(b)(1) (2004), http://www.amlegal.com/library/md/montgomeryco.
shtml (follow "Frames" hyperlink; then follow "Part II. Local Laws, Ordinances,
Resolutions, Etc." hyperlink; then follow "Chapter 25A. Housing, Moderately Priced"
hyperlink) (requiring all subdivisions of twenty or more units to include a minimum
number of moderately priced units in various sizes).
64. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), rev'd, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
65. See Delaney, supra note 45, at 190.
66. Mount Laurel !, 336 A.2d at 718; see also Delaney, supra note 45, at 191.
67. Mount Laurel 1, 336 A.2d at 728.
68. Id. at 725; see also Delaney, supra note 45, at 193.
69. Mount Laurel !, 336 A.2d at 727-28.
70. Id. at 726.
71. Brown, supra note 7, at 608; Nico Calavita et al., Inclusionary Housing in
California and New Jersey: A Comparative Analysis, 8 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 109, 115
(1997); Delaney, supra note 45, at 192; Payne, supra note 63, at 20-21.
72. Delaney, supra note 45, at 195.
73. See Mount Laurel 1H, 456 A.2d 390, 417-18 (N.J. 1983) (admonishing that because
of the legislature's failure to act, the court "must give meaning to the constitutional
doctrine in the cases before us through [its] own devices, even if they are relatively less
suitable"); Delaney, supra note 45, at 195; Payne, supra note 63, at 33.
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Supreme Court prescribed specific ways for the state to implement the
fair-share doctrine in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township
of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I)."74
Other state courts, such as Virginia, 75 New York,76 Pennsylvania, 7  West
Virginia,78 and New Hampshire, 79 have invalidated economic exclusionary
zoning in an attempt to eradicate what has become known as "Not In My
Backyard" (NIMBY) syndrome. 80 NIMBY specifically refers to "the
attitude of persons blessed with affordable housing and their political
representatives" toward change, and their tendency to thwart "efforts to
locate multifamily forms of affordable housing in residential
neighborhoods."
81
74. 456 A.2d at 415 n.5, 416 (lamenting that "[z]oning ordinances that either
encourage [economic, racial, and other forms of segregation] or ratify its results are not
promoting our general welfare, they are destroying it"); see also Iglesias, supra note 16, at
456 (pointing out that the Mount Laurel approach has led to significant debate about the
power struggle between local governments and the states and to what extent a state can
intrude on local decision making).
75. See, e.g., Bd. of County Supervisors v. Carper, 107 S.E.2d 390, 396-97 (Va. 1959)
(holding that maintaining a concentration of small lots in one portion of the county was an
unconstitutional use of the police power because it furthered private rather than public
interests).
76. See, e.g., Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242 (N.Y. 1975)
(requiring local zoning municipalities to consider the general welfare of residents in
surrounding communities).
77. See, e.g., Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 382 A.2d 105, 111-12 (Pa. 1977)
(invalidating, based on the fair-share doctrine, a zoning ordinance that placed a limitation
on multi-family residential uses).
78. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 298 S.E.2d 148, 157-58 (W. Va.
1982). The court disagreed with and overruled a local zoning commission's view that
"[piroperty depreciation and the [economic class] of renters are proper considerations...
because they relate to the 'harmonious development of the municipality,"' id. at 154
(quoting W. VA. CODE § 8-24-30(4) (1976)), as provided by the state's zoning enabling
law. The court's rationale was that "[t]he economic status of prospective inhabitants who
will occupy the proposed subdivision is no more a legitimate consideration than would be
the occupants' sex, race, creed, color, or national origin." Id. at 158. The court also held
that "attempting to use the planning commission as a vehicle to 'plan' out persons of low
income" was impermissible exclusionary zoning. Id. at 157.
79. See, e.g., Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 494-96 (N.H. 1991) (finding
that "[m]unicipalities are not isolated enclaves, far removed from the concerns of the area
in which they are situated [because they are] subdivisions of the State, they do not exist
solely to serve their own residents, and their regulations should promote the general
welfare, both within and without their boundaries," and clarifying that the general welfare
provision of the New Hampshire Constitution includes the "welfare of the 'community"').
80. See Salsich, supra note 7, at 89.
81. Id. The NIMBY affliction has been blamed for other social problems besides the
present shortage of affordable housing, for example, urban sprawl, extensive commuting,
and environmental damage, id. at 92, and racial segregation, see Michael B. Gerrard, The
Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495, 497-99, 520 (1994); see also, Michael
Dear, Understanding and Overcoming the NIMBY Syndrome, 58 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 288,
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(b) State Regulatory Initiatives
State legislatures have also taken steps to limit the discretion
municipalities have over zoning decisions . Some states have sought to
promote inclusionary practices by enacting legislation that generally falls
into two categories: "appeals statutes" (also known as "override
statutes") 83 and comprehensive or centralized planning statutes.8
The first type of inclusionary state legislation, the state override or
appeals statute, provides developers of affordable housing who meet
certain criteria with a procedural remedy when local zoning authorities
deny their proposals for constructing new affordable housing."5 Appeals
statutes allow the state to administratively review and overturn local
zoning decisions and permit-grants, thereby reducing the local
816government's discretion over land use. Their purpose is to ensure that
developers will have the opportunity to build new affordable housing."
The second type of state legislation, the comprehensive or centralized
planning statute, requires that local zoning ordinances conform to a
comprehensive plan established by the state." These statutes areproactive efforts by the state to force local governments to address
288 (1992); Tim Iglesias, Managing Local Opposition to Affordable Housing: A New
Approach to NIMBY, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 78, 79 (2002)
(suggesting that NIMBY, "the most important barrier to the development of affordable
housing after insufficient subsidy .... will never be 'overcome"' and proposing alternative
strategies to manage it in order to achieve affordable housing goals (footnotes omitted)).
82. See Callies, supra note 16, at 197-98 (describing a "shift in governmental
regulation of land use from local governments back to the states" and attributing it to the
"relative lack of planning at the local level, together with a disregard of the regional and
statewide implications of such unplanned local land-use decision making").
83. See Brown, supra note 7, at 601; Edward G. Goetz et al., The Minnesota Land Use
Planning Act and the Promotion of Low- and Moderate-Income Housing in Suburbia, 22
LAW & INEQ. 31, 34 (2004). Override statutes are also known as "builders' remedies." Id.
at 35.
84. See Brown, supra note 7, at 603; Goetz et al., supra note 83, at 38.
85. See Brown, supra note 7, at 612-13.
86. See id. at 613.
87. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-30g (West 2001 & Supp. 2005); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, §§ 21-23 (West 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-53-2, -53-4, -53-5 (1999
& Supp. 2004); see also Brown, supra note 7, at 615; Goetz et al., supra note 83, at 35-36
(highlighting that this approach's success assumes developers have the initiative to provide
affordable housing); Westbrook, supra note 18, at 176 (arguing that the success of such a
statute in Connecticut depends on the court rejecting the highly deferential Euclid
approach in reviewing land-use decisions).
88. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65300 (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3161,
.3194 (West 2000 & Supp. 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 197.010 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE §§
36.70A.010, 70A.040, 70A.070 (2003).
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affordable housing issues in advance.89 Their purpose is to anticipate
solutions based on projections for future housing needs, supply,
population growth, and availability of land. 90 They usually insist only
that local housing decisions are "consistent" with the state's plan, without
establishing specific guidelines for what constitutes "consistent."9'
(c) Local Initiatives
Some local governments have implemented inclusionary policies
absent a judicial or legislative mandate. 92 One of the first and most well
known examples is the Montgomery County, Maryland Moderately
Priced Dwelling Unit ordinance (MPDU). 9 The ordinance represents a
compromise between developers and advocates for affordable housing.
94
For all new developments of twenty or more units, the MPDU requires a
developer to set aside a minimum percentage of affordable housing
options of various sizes.95 In exchange, the developers are allowed to
build beyond the density normally allowed in that zone by up to twenty-
96two percent. Alternatively, developers can avoid the minimum-
percentage requirement in one of the following ways: either by paying
into a County Housing Initiative Fund,97 or by developing a high rise
residential building and offering to build more affordable housing
nearby.9
A Montgomery County property developer may only exercise the first
option if an Alternative Review Committee makes two findings.99 First,
89. See Brown, supra note 7, at 624 (commenting that New Jersey's Fair Housing Act,
an example of this proactive model, "aims to [reduce the occurrence of] adversarial
proceedings").
90. See Goetz et al., supra note 83, at 38-39 (criticizing this approach's failure to
provide "a programmatic means of implementation and.., effective compliance powers").
91. Iglesias, supra note 16, at 454 (noting that the effectiveness of the "consistency
findings" in comprehensive planning statutes have been often criticized).
92. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 25A (2004), http://www.amlegal.
com/library/md/montgomeryco.shtml (follow "Frames" hyperlink; then follow "Part II.
Local Laws, Ordinances, Resolutions, Etc." hyperlink; then follow "Chapter 25A.
Housing, Moderately Priced" hyperlink).
93. See id.; Calavita et al., supra note 71, at 111 ("[The] Montgomery County ...
Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit program . . . is arguably the largest [inclusionary
housing] program of any single local government jurisdiction, resulting in the production
of some 10,000 affordable housing units over a period of nearly 25 years."); Salsich, supra
note 7, at 93 ("The Montgomery County [affordable housing] program is cited frequently
as an example of what courageous and imaginative people can accomplish.").
94. See MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE §§ 25A-1, 25B-1.
95. Id. § 25A-5(a) to (b).
96. Id. § 25A-5(c).
97. Id. §§ 25A-5(e)(1), 25A-5A.
98. Id. §§ 25A-5(e)(2),25A-5B.
99. Id. § 25A-5A(a).
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the Committee must find either that the nature of the proposed
development would render the moderately priced dwelling units
"effectively unaffordable,"' 0 because of a financially prohibitive
"indivisible package of resident services and facilities" for the would-be
inhabitants of the units,10 1 or that environmental constraints would render
the units "economically infeasible." 102 Second, the Committee must find
that the alternative would benefit the public more than including the
affordable units within the proposed development. 03 A Montgomery
County property developer may only exercise the second option if the
director of the County Department of Housing and Community Affairs
makes two findings.' First, the director must find that the alternative
would benefit the public more than including the affordable units within
the proposed development. Second, the director must find that the
alternative will "further the objective of providing a broad range of
housing opportunities."'1 6 The payment and land options are thus
disfavored by the ordinance.' °7
The housing trust fund (HTF) is another local initiative intended to
ease the affordable housing problem.08 An HTF is a community-
administered fund that has a specifically identified source and a named
purpose or beneficiary.' °9 Sources of revenue for the trust funds vary
100. Id. § 25A-5A(a)(1)(A).
101. Id.
102. Id. § 25A-5A(a)(1)(B).
103. Id. § 25A-5A(a)(2).
104. Id. § 25A-5B(a).
105. Id. § 25A-5B(a)(1).
106. Id. § 25-5B(a)(2).
107. See Salsich, supra note 7, at 93 ("[Tjhe contribution of land or cash alternatives
may not be approved if the developer 'can feasibly build significantly more [affordable
housing] at another site."' (quoting MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 25A)). This
preference for actual construction of affordable units also appears in New Jersey case law.
See Fair Share Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, 802 A.2d 512, 526-27 (N.J. 2002)
(disagreeing with the administrative agency charged with implementing the fair-share
doctrine enunciated in Mount Laurel on whether a project is considered to be inclusionary
when the developer pays a fee in lieu of constructing affordable housing, and holding that
where a developer chooses this alternative rather than actually constructing affordable
housing, it is not entitled to the same cost benefits offered by law to inclusionary
developers).
108. See Mary E. Brooks, Housing Trust Funds: Seeking Security in Housing Finance, 5
J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 55, 55-62 (1995).
109. See id. at 55-56 (listing real estate transfer taxes and exaction fees collected from
developers as examples of the sources for such HTFs and pointing out that the purpose of
such funds is specific to the needs of the community); Iglesias, supra note 16, at 449-50 &
499 n.64 (arguing that the local policy of requiring commercial developers to pay a housing
impact fee, based on the expected housing demands their proposed development will
have, is an example of the positive role local governments can have in promoting
affordable housing).
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among jurisdictions,"0 but two common sources are real estate transfer
taxes." and impact fees for nonresidential development, which are fees
imposed "to offset the impact of their development on the housing
market.""12 These funds are used to promote a variety of housing goals
such as "new construction, rehabilitation, weatherization, housing-
related services, rental assistance, [and] foreclosure prevention."" 3 State
governments are increasingly attracted to the HTF approach and, as of
the spring of 2004, as many as thirty-four states had adopted it as part of
their solution to the affordable housing shortage. The federal
government has also considered, but not yet implemented, the HTF
approach.'
Despite all of these state and local initiatives to eradicate exclusionary
zoning practices associated with NIMBY, some land-use professionals
and developers have acknowledged that local opposition to the
development of new affordable housing will always frustrate inclusionary
goals."' From their perspective, the most effective way to deal with
110. Beth Parr, Note, Almost Home: Policy and Politics in the Campaign for a National
Housing Trust Fund, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 321, 329 (2004).
111. Id.; see also Brooks, supra note 108, at 55.
112. MARY E. BROOKS, CTR. FOR CMTY. CHANGE, HOUSING TRUST FUND
PROGRESS REPORT 2002: LOCAL RESPONSES TO AMERICA'S HOUSING NEEDS 2 (2002).
113. Brooks, supra note 108, at 57-58.
114. See Kristin Larsen, Florida's Housing Trust Funds -Addressing the State's
Affordable Housing Needs, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 525, 529 (2004) (noting that the
number of states that established an HTF increased by thirty-five percent over ten years).
115. Parr, supra note 110, at 331-32. Similar to local HTFs that have been
implemented in some communities, the proposed Federal Housing Trust Fund (FHTF)
would generate funds from specific sources and allocate them to qualifying jurisdictions to
assist with housing affordability problems. See Federal Housing Trust Fund Act of 1994,
H.R. 5275, 103d Cong. §§ 101(a), 103(a) (1994) (identifying the sources for the proposed
fund as reduced homeowner tax deductions for high-income taxpayers and reduced
property tax deductions from high-income taxpayers). Its passage would result in a thirty
billion dollar commitment to provide low-income families with access to affordable
housing. Parr, supra note 110, at 321. However, workforce families seeking home-
ownership would not benefit from this proposal because their income level would preclude
them from qualifying for the assistance. See id. at 331. A majority of the fund would assist
extremely low-income and very low-income families, id. at 331, which are defined as
earning no more than fifty percent of the median income, id. at 324, whereas workforce
families earn at least fifty percent of the median income, McIlwain, supra note 4, at 30.
Thus, the fund would primarily facilitate affordable rental housing. Parr, supra note 110,
at 331.
116. See, e.g., Iglesias, supra note 81, at 79 ("[L]ocal opposition will never be
'overcome' so a more reasonable framing from the developer's perspective is 'managing'
local opposition."). But see John McIlwain, Density Is a Seven-Letter Word,
MULTIFAMILY TRENDS, Fall 2003, at 8, 8 (arguing that the NIMBY attitude is partly a
result of "[l]arge public housing projects [that destroyed] many decent neighborhoods in
the 1950s and 1960s," but that today "most new multifamily developments consist of 100
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NIMBY is to anticipate local opposition to affordable housing and
proactively design strategies to overcome it."7 This approach has been
referred to by one commentator as "managing local opposition"
(MLO)." s It incorporates "legal strategies, community organizing, and
public relations strategies."" 9  Marketing the new development as
"workforce housing" rather than "low-income housing,"'2 ° recruiting a
base of community supporters to reach out to concerned neighbors,'
2
'
holding community meetings to dispel misinformation, 22 researching the
local law and drafting a demand letter to compel the approval of the
proposed development,' 23 and seeking favorable media coverage for the
proposed development' 24 are examples of successful ways to implement
the MLO approach. This approach facilitates the construction of
affordable housing, yet respects local communities by working with them
in order to avoid litigation.1
2
1
(d) Miscellaneous Small-Scale Initiatives
The nation's collective response to the workforce housing shortage has
included various small-scale efforts. 1 6 Because there are presently not
enough of these, their overall effect is limited. They often require
philanthropic or special-interest, rather than purely economic,
128incentive. An interesting example of such an initiative is Brindledorf, a
to 200 units, are carefully designed and sited, and have modest to luxurious amenities" and
normally "increase property values" in the surrounding area).
117. See Iglesias, supra note 81, at 79-80 (discussing the success of the Managing Local
Opposition (MLO) approach in obtaining local government approval of proposals to
develop affordable housing in northern California).
118. Id. at 79.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 88.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 89-90.
123. Id. at 94.
124. Id. at 96.
125. See id. at 79-80.
126. See Michael Bodaken, The Increasing Shortage of Affordable Rental Housing in
America: Action Items for Preservation, HOUSING FACTS & FINDINGS (Fannie Mae
Found., Wash., D.C.) Vol.4, No.4, 2002, at 5-7, available at http://www.fanniemae
foundation.org/programs/hff/pdf/HFF-v4i4.pdf ("New, nonspeculative owners are
beginning to develop preservation ownership businesses.").
127. See id. at 7.
128. See id. at 6. The author makes the following argument regarding these private
investments:
Strong, business-minded/socially motivated, preservation entities (either
nonprofit or for profit, but always nonspeculative) are essential to the
preservation and improvement of affordable housing. Indeed, any business
model for sustainability requires the presence of such entities. Put another way,
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moderately-priced cooperative living community in Silver Spring,
Maryland.129 The creators of this community describe themselves as real
estate investors who have a genuine desire to "serve the community,""'3
and are committed to "'[d]o the right thing and care about people"" 3' by
simply "providing nice places where people can live."'3 2  They
refurbished an 1880s farmhouse on six acres of land to house teachers
who are priced out of most other decent housing that is near where they
work.'
II. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING PROBLEM
The federal government is involved in housing in three main ways:
first, the federal government's tax policy is crafted so as to encourage
home ownership; 3 4 second, its influence over housing finance has
facilitated home ownership, especially in the suburbs; 135 and third, the
federal government helps low income groups obtain housing.
36
The tax incentive is the most indirect but also the most influential way
the federal government is involved in housing issues.33  The federal
government's tax policy encourages home ownership by providing
we can't save affordable housing unless there are capable stewards willing to take
on this important responsibility.
A core national policy objective should be the assembly of a new group of
interested, vigorous owners willing to invest new resources into this housing.
Below-market investments and grants are needed to sustain these new entities.
Id.
129. See Schulte, supra note 2; Karen Ceraso, Eyesore to Community Asset,
SHELTERFORCE (Nat'l Hous. Inst., Montclair, N.J.) July/Aug. 1999, http://www.nhi.org/
online/issues/106/ceraso.html (describing how goals other than economic profit, such as
historic preservation, have furthered affordable housing).
130. Schulte, supra note 2.
131. Id. (quoting Sue Eynon Lark, co-owner of the Brindledorf cooperative living
community).
132. Brindledorf Homepage, http://www.brindledorf.com (last visited Dec. 16, 2005).
133. Schulte, supra note 2; see also David Listokin & Barbara Listokin, Historic
Preservation and Affordable Housing: Leveraging Old Resources for New Opportunities,
HOUSING FACTS & FINDINGS (Fannie Mae Found., Wash., D.C.), Vol.3, No.2, 2001,
http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hff/v3i2-histpres.shtml (describing the
trend of restoring older buildings to further the goals of both historic preservation and
affordable housing); cf Homing in on the Risks, ECONOMIST, June 5, 2004 at 12-13
(describing the general phenomenon that "surging house values have priced out first-time
buyers").
134. KELLY & BECKER, supra note 60, at 381.
135. Id. at 378.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 381; Mcllwain, supra note 4, at 26, 32 (arguing that the federal
government should exercise this influence in other ways to promote affordable housing
and development strategies).
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significant tax benefits to those that own a home."3 The tax policy does
not provide all socioeconomic groups with access to the financial
advantage of home ownership and does nothing to promote affordable
housing."'
The second way the federal government is involved in housing issues is
primarily historical. Through the Federal Housing Administration and
the Veterans Administration programs, the federal government made
mortgage funding more accessible to more people by reducing the
percentage required for a down payment.'"° Today, these programs have
largely been replaced by private mortgage companies, but their influence
over the basic structure of housing finance has persisted. 4' However,
because house prices are rising at a faster rate than salaries, first-time
buyers and workforce families are unable to meet monthly payments on
homes, which nullifies the fact that down payment requirements are
lower than they were before the federal government became involved in
housing finance.
42
The federal government's third role in housing has been to provide
low-income housing.143 It has done so in various ways, beginning with the
Housing Act of 1937,'" which provided funding for public housing. 4
Recently, federal housing and community development programs, which
138. See Home Sweet Home, ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2003, at 13, 13-14 ("In America,
only a fool . . . or somebody too rich to care would refuse the handouts that the
government lavishes on home-owners.").
139. Cf id. (acknowledging the advantage of this policy, that "home owners (with a
stake in their communities) are better and happier citizens," as well as the disadvantage,
that it "reward[s] the rich more generously than the moderately prosperous, and ... the
poor-who cannot aspire to buy property, even on heavily subsidised terms- not at all").
140. See KELLY & BECKER, supra note 60, at 379 (crediting these programs for
"making home ownership the norm within the United States"). These federal programs
provided mortgage insurance and guaranteed low-interest, long-term mortgages with low
down payments. Id.
141. See id. The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) adopted the
Federal Housing Administration standards for which homes qualify for mortgage
insurance. Id. Fannie Mae is a "mortgage pool ... that is the largest buyer of home
mortgages in the United States." Id. Other ways the federal government is currently
involved in housing finance are through the Government National Mortgage Association,
which also "buys mortgages backed by the [Federal Housing Administration] and
[Veterans Administration]," id. at 380, and the Farmers Home Administration, which
provides loans for housing and community development in rural areas, id.
142. See ZHONG YI TONG, FANNIE MAE FOUND., HOMEOWNERSHIP
AFFORDABILITY IN URBAN AMERICA: PAST AND FUTURE 5 (2004).
143. KELLY & BECKER, supra note 60, at 378.
144. Act of Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1437).
145. KELLY & BECKER, supra note 60, at 380.
[Vol. 55:439
The Exclusionary Effect of "Mansionization"
146
are now administered by HUD, generally embody four different
strategies: providing private sector incentives for development of low-
income rental housing, distributing block grants, revitalizing "severely
distressed" public housing, and mortgaging and insuring low-income
rental housing.1 47  Lately, HUD's goal has been to "consolidate[] and
privatize[] many of its programs while placing more responsibility on
state and local governments.', 48  AcCordingly, it still administers
programs, which have been underfunded because of periodic efforts to
curb federal social spending,14 but does not play a significant role in the
affordable housing effort for workforce and moderate-income families.50
In 1999, the federal government established the bipartisan Millennial
Housing Commission (MHC) to investigate the extent of the housing
problem. 5  The MHC issued a report in May 200252 that suggested
various ways to deal with current challenges, 13 but the federal
114government has yet to adopt any of its suggestions . Meanwhile, its
146. MILLENNIAL HOUS. COMM'N, supra note 6, at 23. HUD was created in 1965. Id.
147. Id. at 23-24; see also U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PROGRAMS OF HUD
8-108 (2005), available at http://www.huduser.org/whatsnew/ProgramsHUD05.pdf
(describing HUD's various programs). These programs, though important, do little to
promote affordable housing for the middle class, and are thus beyond the scope of this
Comment.
148. KELLY & BECKER, supra note 60, at 381.
149. Id. at 380-81.
150. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, HOME
Investment Partnerships Program, Description of Eligible Customers, http://www.hud.gov/
offices/cpd/affordablehousing/programs/home/index.cfm (last updated Dec. 8, 2005).
States and localities must meet the HOME program's eligibility requirement to receive
funding:
For rental housing and rental assistance, at least 90 percent of benefiting families
must have incomes that are no more than 60 percent of the HUD-adjusted
median family income for the area. In rental projects with five or more assisted
units, at least 20% of the units must be occupied by families with incomes that do
not exceed 50% of the HUD-adjusted median. The incomes of households
receiving HUD assistance must not exceed 80 percent of the area median.
Id.
151. Act of Oct. 20, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-74, § 206(a)-(c), 113 Stat. 1047, 1070
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12701 note (2000) (Millennial Housing Commission)).
Its tasks were to examine the importance of housing, the possibilities for providing
affordable housing by using the private sector, and the effectiveness of HUD programs.
152. See MILLENNIAL HoUS. COMM'N, supra note 6. The report stated that
affordable housing "is the single greatest housing challenge facing the nation." Id. at 14.
153. See id. at 29-42, 43-70, 71-83 (suggesting several new strategies, as well as
improvements to strategies already in place, and listed a series of supporting
recommendations based on its findings).
154. See John K. Mcllwain, Doing More for Affordable Housing, MULTIFAMILY
TRENDS, Summer 2003, at 8, 8. The MHC report
was the product of a year's work by some of the country's best housing minds,
backed by excellent staff and millions of taxpayer dollars. Yet one may be
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enabling statute terminated the MHC in August 2002.151
III. FISCAL ZONING THROUGH THE AREA VARIANCE: LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS' UNREGULATED DISCRETION TO GRANT EXCEPTIONS
TO ZONING NORMS
A variance is an exception to general zoning regulations that only the
local zoning authority can grant to a property owner. 156 There are two
types of variances: the use variance, which allows a property owner to
use his property in a way that would violate zoning regulations,"' and the
area variance, which allows a property owner to build a structure whose
• .• 158
size or dimensions would violate zoning regulations. Variances are a
practical acknowledgement that a zoning ordinance can not provide for
unforeseen circumstances and that there needs to be some degree of
flexibility on a case-by-case basis.'59  Variances have traditionally
operated as a "safety-valve"'60 to avoid unconstitutional regulatory
takings of private property.161
The legal requirements for granting an area zoning variance are
determined by each state.162 States generally require that some or all of
the following conditions apply:163 strictly enforcing the ordinance would
forgiven for having forgotten the report, given . . . the resounding silence from
Capitol Hill in response to the report .... Unfortunately, both Congress and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development ... have been quietly hoping
the report will disappear, which it all but has ....
Id.
155. Act of Oct. 20, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-74, § 206(g), 113 Stat. 1047, 1072 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12701 note (2000) (Millennial Housing Commission)).
156. See COON & DAMSKY, supra note 46, at 93-96 (defining the variance).
157. Id. at 94.
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., David W. Owens, The Zoning Variance: Reappraisal and
Recommendations for Reform of a Much-Maligned Tool, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 279,
282-84 (2004) (tracing the history of the variance concept back to the New York City
Building Code in 1862 and describing the practical necessity of variances for unusual and
unanticipated situations).
160. See id. at 283 & n.8 (explaining the "safety-valve" analogy and providing
examples of cases that have used it).
161. See id. at 288-89 & 289 n.29 ("A land use regulation that deprives the owner of all
economically beneficial or productive use is, with limited exceptions, an unconstitutional
taking."). The Fifth Amendment prohibits uncompensated takings. U.S. CONST. amend.
V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.").
162. See Owens, supra note 159, at 284 ("[Tjhe precise formulation used by the states,
along with the judicial interpretation that has been applied, varies.").
163. See, e.g., id. All states have modeled their law on variances after the Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act, see DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 4.15, at 4-12
(2003), which allows the local zoning authority
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impose unnecessary hardship or practical difficulties on the landowner;'64
the exception would protect, or is consistent with, public welfare;165 the
exception is consistent with the intent of the ordinance;' 66 granting the
variance is in the interest of justice;' 67 the exception will not threaten the
character of the neighborhood; 68 and granting the variance does not
threaten the rights of others.
69
Though these statutory requirements for granting variances are
vaguely worded, 7° when variances are challenged through litigation
courts have traditionally interpreted the requirements strictly.' 7' Courts
maintain that the power to grant variances should be "'sparingly
exercised and only in rare instances and under exceptional circumstances
peculiar in their nature, and with due regard to the main purpose of a
zoning ordinance to preserve the property rights of others.", 72 According
to one expert, 73 the judicial test for what constitutes an unnecessary
hardship or practical difficulty is so stringent that "it is the rare variance
request that meets such a ... test ... and the fact that [absent litigation]
variances are routinely approved without meeting it has long been a
principal judicial and academic criticism of variance practice.' ' 74 Some
"[t]o authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variance from the terms of the
ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where, owing to special
conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result in
unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed
and substantial justice done."
Id. § 6.41, at 6-45 (quoting STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7 (1924)).
164. See C. R. McCorkle, Annotation, Construction and Application of Provisions for
Variations in Application of Zoning Regulations and Special Exceptions Thereto, 168
A.L.R. 13, 23 (1947).





170. See Owens, supra note 159, at 285. Professor Owens points to Frank E. Horack,
Jr. and William M. Maltbie as prominent legal minds who have criticized the vague
standards for zoning variances. Id. at 285 n.20, 286 n.21. Maltbie stated that the
unnecessary hardship and practical difficulties standards "almost defy critical analysis."
William M. Maltbie, The Legal Background of Zoning, 22 CONN. B.J. 2, 6-7 (1948).
171. See Owens, supra note 159, at 287-88.
172. Id. (quoting Hammond v. Bd. of Appeal, 54 N.E. 82, 83 (Mass. 1926)).
173. Professor Owens is a Professor of Public Law and Government at the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Id. at 279, n.*.
174. Id. at 289; see also Nancy Perkins Spyke, What's Land Got To Do With It?:
Rhetoric and Indeterminacy in Land's Favored Legal Status, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 387, 405-06
(2004) (arguing that the standard for what constitutes an unnecessary hardship or practical
difficulty is often more lenient for area variances than for use variances). Professor Spyke
further explains that:
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courts have distinguished between the use variance and the area
variance, and have interpreted the requirements for an area variance
more broadly. 75  Even though state zoning laws treat both kinds of
variances identically,176  these courts have justified relaxing the
requirements for area variances by claiming that an area variance poses
less of a threat to both the surrounding property owners and planning
efforts than does a use variance.
17
Improperly granting area variances is problematic for workforce
housing affordability. In practice, "[w]hile the courts consistently
characterized the variance as a narrow tool for relief in extraordinary
situations, the variance . . . has been widely used as a device for much
broader zoning flexibility.' '179 The effect of such "abuse of the variance
power [is to] undermin[e] the effectiveness of planning and responsible
land use regulation,"' including the planning and regulation that
promotes affordable workforce housing.8  Moreover, area variances are
[t]he relaxation of the unnecessary hardship test in non-use variance situations
suggests that the private property rights of landowners are given greater weight
when matters such as area, height, and setbacks are concerned, while the aims of
local planners diminish in importance.
It is not uncommon . . . for zoning ordinances to impose a more lenient
standard of hardship when a non-use variance is sought.
Id. at 406.
175. See Owens, supra note 159, at 289 & n.31.
176. Id. at 290.
177. Id.; see also Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The "Unique Circumstances" Rule in
Zoning Variances-An Aid in Achieving Greater Prudence and Less Leniency, 31 URB.
LAW. 127, 129-30 (1999).
178. Cf The Money Gang: Fighting Monster Homes (CNNfn television broadcast Aug.
20, 2004), 2004 WL 83698470 [hereinafter Fighting Monster Homes] (pointing out that
mansionization eliminates starter homes).
179. Owens, supra note 159, at 295. Studies of variance practice have shown an
approval rate of over fifty percent after 1925, over seventy percent after 1945, and nearly
eighty percent after 1960 until 1990, and this has caused "[a]cademics and land use lawyers
... to view the variance with alarm." Id. at 295-96. Owens details several "[p]rominent
critiques" of the local misuse of the variance: Richard Babcock, who found variance
decisions in practice were "unprincipled and undisciplined," and generally a "'debacle,"'
id. at 297; Robert Anderson, who concluded that "variance decisions were erratic,
unpredictable, and not based on judicially established standards," id.; Jesse Dukeminer
and Clyde Stapelton, who found variance decisions were being made "with little regard for
the rule of law, were inconsistent[,] . . . usurped legislative functions, and rendered
portions of the zoning ordinance ineffective," id.; and Ronald Shapiro, who lamented the
"the 'shocking [sic] disparity between the theory of the variance power and its practical
application' with a resultant 'flood of illegal variations which challenge the protective aims
of zoning,"' id. (quoting Ronald M. Shapiro, The Zoning Variance Power - Constructive
in Theory, Destructive in Practice, 29 MD. L. REV. 3, 3 (1969)).
180. Id. at 297.
181. Id. at 280. In fact,
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the most commonly requested variances, and are frequently granted. '
They allow residential property owners to deviate from maximum height
and dimension requirements to increase the size and value of theirhomes. 184
IV. THE ADEQUACY OF THE VARIOUS LEGAL APPROACHES TO THE
WORKFORCE HOUSING SHORTAGE AND How IT IS UNDERMINED BY
IMPROPER GRANTS OF AREA VARIANCES
A. Developing Affordable Housing: Proactive Versus Reactive Legal
Approaches
Legal approaches to the workforce housing problem can be divided
into two main categories: proactive strategies to promote the
development of affordable housing, and reactive strategies where
developers of affordable housing are unable to obtain permits based on
zoning rules. 85 The Mount Laurel approach' 86 and state override statutes
or appeals statutes87 are examples of reactive solutions to affordable
housing.' 88 They operate as fall-back options for developers who want to
build affordable housing but can not get permission because the zoning
[lhand use professionals have held an uneasy suspicion that much of the
careful balancing of public and private interests accomplished in plan making
and ordinance adoption is surreptitiously negated by undisciplined variance
administration. A conventional wisdom has developed that the zoning variance
is widely abused -that it is used to quietly grant special favors to the politically
connected, that uneducated lay boards apply their peculiar notion of justice
rather than judiciously applying narrowly defined legal standards, or that these
unelected boards substitute their own judgment as to what the zoning ordinance
should be rather than faithfully applying the regulations adopted by elected
officials. Both variance petitioners and neighbors have decried arbitrary
decision-making procedures in the variance process ....
Id. at 280-81. Such abuse directly undercuts efforts to achieve workforce housing
affordability.
182. See id. at 310 ("By far the most common variance requested is from regulations
establishing setbacks for principal structures.").
183. See id. at 309 (reporting that a recent study of variance practice in North Carolina
revealed a seventy-two percent approval rate).
184. See COON & DAMSKY, supra note 46, at 94-96. Such deviations can impact the
value of surrounding lots as well. Cf. Fighting Monster Homes, supra note 178.
185. See Brown, supra note 7, at 600-01 (identifying types of "existing [state]
solutions").
186. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.(a).
187. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.(b).
188. See Brown, supra note 7, at 615 (describing the provisions of the Massachusetts
Low and Moderate Income Housing Act which permits a developer to appeal local zoning
board decisions). The Massachusetts law was the model for similar statutes enacted in
Connecticut and Rhode Island. Id. at 613.
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regulations prohibit or exclude that type of development. 9  These
approaches, although necessary to ensure that the permit-denial is not
arbitrary or exclusionary, depend on developers' initiative to construct
affordable housing for any possible success in promoting affordable
housing.90 If there is no developer who wants to build affordable
housing, these fall-back options are never exercised, and their positive
influence on affordable housing is never realized.'9' They are effective in
dealing with a present affordable housing crunch; that is, where there is
an immediate need for affordable housing and an immediate proposed
solution.1 92 However they can be defeated by communities that are
willing to "engag[e] in a legal war of attrition [through litigation] until it
no longer [makes] sense for the developer to proceed."' 93
Conversely, proactive efforts, such as comprehensive planning
statutes,194 mandatory set-asides,'95  and HTFs, 96  are inclusionary
measures that attempt to provide for future affordable housing needs."9
Although the actual success of mandatory set-asides and HTFs is
198tangible, it is limited.' 99 Inclusionary zoning ordinances that require
mandatory set-asides, such as the MPDU in Montgomery County,
Maryland,20 have provided some affordable housing, but the
affordability of such housing has often been lost.2 " Originally, the
MPDU only protected the affordability of the units it created for a
period of ten years, after which time they could be sold at fair market
189. See id. at 615.
190. See Goetz et al., supra note 83, at 35-36, 35 n.21, 36 n.31.
191. See id. at 36.
192. Cf Brown, supra note 7, at 613-15 (describing the Massachusetts appeals statute
that applies only when developers seek permits to build affordable housing, but are
denied).
193. Id. at 620.
194. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.(b).
195. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.(c).
196. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.(c).
197. See Brown, supra note 7, at 624-25 (contrasting this approach, which he
categorizes as a "carrot," from the reactive builder's remedy, which he categorizes as a
"stick"); Larsen, supra note 114, at 525 (classifying the HTF approach as "incentive-
based").
198. See Brown, supra note 7, at 633 (noting that "[b]etween 1974 and 1997, 10,110
affordable units were created, including 7,305 units for sale and 2,805 units for rental"
because of the MPDU).
199. Cf Parr, supra note 110, at 329 n.65 ("Most state and local funds are targeted at
populations earning no more than 80% of area median income.").
200. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 25A-5(a) to (b) (2004),
http://www.amlegal.com/library/md/montgomeryco.shtml (follow "Frames" hyperlink;
then follow "Part 11. Local Laws, Ordinances, Resolutions, Etc." hyperlink; then follow
"Chapter 25A. Housing, Moderately Priced" hyperlink).
201. See Barker, supra note 7.
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202
value. Meanwhile, the MPDU only facilitates the development of new
affordable workforce housing units, and the county is running out of land
203for such projects. Similarly, HTFs have helped people find housing
they can afford,2°' but they only help a small number of people with the
greatest need.20 5  Assistance under the HTF approach is properly
reserved for low-income residents, and even then, there is not enough
money to help them all.206 Their effect on the larger housing affordability
problem is minimal.2
Comprehensive planning statutes are sensible in theory, but tend to
use vague language rather than concrete requirements, and have had
limited success. 208 They are merely a statutory acknowledgement of the
fair-share doctrine, often without specific guidelines. 2°9 For example, the
Oregon planning statute requires local governments to "encourage the
availability of adequate numbers of needed housing units at price ranges
and rent levels which are commensurate with the financial capabilities of
Oregon households., 210 It imposes no specific fair-share requirements,
nor does it provide incentives for developers to build workforce
housing.21 Although forward-thinking is an important aspect of ensuring
sustainable communities, requiring mere consistency with a vague goal
212demands little and is essentially ineffective in practice.
202. Id. The City County Council for Montgomery County extended this time period
in 2004. Act of Nov. 30, 2004, No. 24-04/25-04/27-03, § 1 (County Council for Montgomery
County, Md. 2004), [website] http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/content/council/2004
bills/25-04.pdf (amending § 25A-3(g) by extending the county's price control to thirty
years for purchased units and ninety-nine years for rental units).
203. Barker, supra note 7.
204. See Brooks, supra note 108, at 61-62 (discussing "[slucess [sitories"); Parr, supra
note 110, at 330.
205. See Brooks, supra note 108, at 56.
206. See id.
207. Cf Larsen, supra note 114, at 535 (describing the HTF approach's potential as
"an essential tool for realizing the state's affordable housing needs" that have not yet been
realized).
208. Brown, supra note 7, at 627, 632.
209. See Goetz et al., supra note 83, at 38-39.
210. OR. DEP'T OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., OAR 660-015-0000(10),
OREGON'S STATEWIDE PLANNING GOALS & GUIDELINES: GOAL 10: HOUSING 1,
http://www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD/docs/goals/goallO.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2005).
211. See Brown, supra note 7, at 628.
212. See, e.g., Goetz et al., supra note 83, at 38-39; Iglesias, supra note 16, at 454.
Furthermore, in spite of the Oregon statute, Portland has become "one of the most
expensive places in the country to live." John Mcllwain, Housing Affordability: Can Smart
Growth Principles Help To Provide for Sufficient Affordable Workforce Housing in Urban
Areas?, URB. LAND, Jan. 2002 at 46-47. Some even suggest that Portland's approach has
actually resulted in a shortage of affordable housing, though there is no consensus on the
merits of this suggestion. See id. at 47-49. The problem in Portland, like many rapidly
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A combination of both reactive and proactive approaches is a more
effective means of promoting affordable housing.213 Although proactive
approaches anticipate the future need for workforce housing, the
reactive approaches described above focus on the immediate need for
workforce housing.2 4 Neither approach is sufficient alone, but combined
they address most aspects of the affordable workforce housing
problem.1 5 Municipalities adopting these approaches should continually
216reevaluate the programs to ensure ongoing effectiveness.
B. Can Local Governments Be Trusted To Consider Their Fair Share?
The Tension Between Localism and Regionalism
The state's regional interests in providing housing for its economically
diverse population are often at odds with local governments' interests in
217developing their own communities. Courts and state legislatures have
begun to take over land-use decision making in order to eliminate
exclusionary zoning, NIMBY tendencies, and the failure of local
governments to consider their fair share of the larger regional housing
needs.21 8 This trend, known as "regionalism,, 219 puts the state's regional
interest in an adequate supply of workforce and low-income housing
first. 220 Regionalism tends to deprive local governments of their
traditional broad discretion over land use, known as "localism,, 221 using
the various proactive and reactive approaches discussed above.222
Because states and courts increasingly impose inclusionary measures,
local zoning authorities no longer have unfettered discretion over their
growing cities, is the result of failure by "planners to anticipate the rate at which
Portland's population would grow." Id. at 48. Comprehensive planning thus relies on
future planning, which is inherently uncertain. Id.
213. See Calavita et al., supra note 71, at 138 (concluding that the effect of the two
types of inclusionary approaches, alone, is limited but that "[a]ny truly serious effort to
address the needs of lower-income populations must call upon a more comprehensive
range of tools and remedies"(emphasis added)).
214. See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
215. See Calavita et al., supra note 71, at 138.
216. Montgomery County, Maryland, for example, amended its MPDU program in
2004. See supra note 202.
217. See Brown, supra note 7, at 601; cf Iglesias, supra note 16, at 451.
218. See, e.g., Mount Laurel 1, 336 A.2d 713, 724 (N.J. 1975), rev'd, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J.
1983); see also supra Part I.B.2.(b) (discussing regional regulatory measures implemented
in various states).
219. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, Recentralization: Community Economic
Development and the Case for Regionalism, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 131, 144-49
(2004).
220. See id. at 144.
221. See Iglesias, supra note 16, at 455.
222. See supra Part IV.A.
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land-use decision making. 3 More often local entities must answer to the
state or the court system when they are not careful to consider fair-share
• • • 224
principles.
State and judicial encroachment on local authority is justified, despite
evidence that local communities can undertake such efforts themselves
by establishing a local HTF or their own inclusionary ordinances.
2
Because regionalism only interferes with localism where local authorities
fail to provide housing for residents of all economic levels, it is not
226inconsistent with these local initiatives. Accordingly, regionalism is an
.• 227
essential component to a workforce housing strategy.
Some proposed inclusionary approaches are mindful of both
228
regionalism and localism. These programs appear to be the most
promising alternatives amidst a growing consensus that it is important for
local governments to have some autonomy over decisions directly
•• 229
affecting their communities. Recognizing that state and local
governments have a common interest in land use, these proposed
strategies attempt to strike a balance between the state's desire for
uniformity and the locality's interest in autonomy. 230 Two examples of
such hybrid approaches are the "housing impact assessment" (HIA)
21 232
regime and the "regional housing legislature" (RHL) approach.
223. See Brown, supra note 7, at 603 (lamenting that because of this decreased local
control, such inclusionary measures are "failures").
224. See discussion supra notes 62-63, 82-84 and accompanying text.
225. But cf Brown, supra note 7, at 633-34 (concluding that the reason for
Montgomery County's success is that it has no municipalities, and arguing that "local
governments inhibit the construction of affordable housing").
226. See id. at 634 (pointing out that it is not necessary for "an all-powerful regional
government [to] displace all local control" and arguing that a body that represents "the
will of the region's inhabitants as a whole. . . . can operate in concert with local
governments, rather than replacing them")
227. See Brown, supra note 7, at 633-34 (referencing a MPDU enthusiast who claims
that a "'highly fragmented metro area has little ability to agree on socially controversial
policies, absent powerful compulsion by state or federal law"' (quoting DAVID RUSK,
CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 86 (1993))); Larsen, supra note 114, at 529.
228. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 7, at 648; Iglesias, supra note 16, at 512.
229. Brown, supra note 7, at 648.
230. See, e.g., Iglesias, supra note 16, at 458 (noting that regionalism is an unlikely goal
and solutions must respect traditions of localism).
231. Id. at 475-83.
232. See Brown, supra note 7, at 648-59.
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The HIA regime is a proposed state regulatory approach."' This
system would allow local governments to retain authority over land-use
while forcing them to "serve the states' housing goals., 234  It would
require local governments, which tend to ignore housing issues, to take
them into consideration when implementing zoning regulations 23' by
making an initial assessment of whether a zoning decision may adversely
impact "the supply, affordability or availability of housing., 236 Where the
local government finds in the affirmative, more detailed state review and,
if necessary, public hearings would follow. 23' These procedures would
require a legitimate and extensive inquiry, in which the local government
would participate, that adheres to carefully crafted standards to carry out
238the comprehensive plan for the region.
The RHL approach is another proposed solution to the shortage of
239
affordable workforce housing. It would "combine[] the successful
elements of the existing [state regulatory approaches] ... with respect for
local autonomy., 24' The RHL itself is a "democratically elected body
composed of representatives from each of the region's localities, charged
with establishing a coherent regional affordable housing policy., 241 The
RHL would take over the roles of making regional housing policy,
supervising local communities to ensure they act in accordance with such
policy, and would act "as the tribunal to enforce its own mandates.
2 42
Both of these strategies promote cooperation between the state and
local authorities, but do not return to the broad permissive principles
articulated in Euclid.24' These efforts acknowledge that increased
233. See Iglesias, supra note 16, at 438 (advocating this approach as a promising
solution to the present affordable housing crisis). This system is modeled after the
"environmental impact statement," a successful federal initiative in the 1970s that has
forced local governments to take the environmental impact of their land-use decisions into
consideration, "help[ing] turn around America's environmental policies." 1d. at 434-35.
234. Id. at 459.
235. Id. at 461-63.
236. Id. at 477-78 (proposing this strategy to deal not only with variances, but also with
all government decisions that affect housing).
237. See id. at 480-81 (describing the HIA procedure as a cumulative effort by the state
and local government to ensure the proposed development does not threaten affordable
housing).
238. See id.
239. See Brown, supra note 7, at 599.
240. Id. at 648.
241. Id. at 599. Brown also argues that the RHC will provide "democratic legitimacy
... by giving each locality a meaningful voice in the development of regional affordable
housing policy" and will therefore avoid the "contentiousness of existing affordable
housing solutions." Id.
242. Id. at 648.
243. See id. at 661; Iglesias, supra note 16, at 514.
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regional controls over local authority can be more helpful than harmful
in providing more affordable housing for citizens of diverse economic
backgrounds.'44
C. The Battle Against NIMBY Has Overlooked a Practice That Has the
Same Exclusionary Effect-Mansionization
Despite the trend toward more judicial and legislative control over
local zoning requirements, 45 local authority to grant exceptions to zoning
246
requirements remains broad. The various affordable housing strategies
described have focused almost exclusively on new development
proposals that aim to increase the supply of affordable workforce
housing.247  Because current projections indicate that demand for
affordable housing will continue to increase, this focus is well-placed.248
However, affordable housing strategies should consider the causes of the
249increase in home prices.
The local zoning authority's unfettered discretion to grant area
variances is having a disparate effect on efforts to promote affordable
21
workforce housing. Improper grants of area variances contribute to
the growing problem of "mansionization," a "trend-now rampant in the
244. See Brown, supra note 7, at 661; Iglesias, supra note 16, at 515.
245. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
246. See Owens, supra note 159, at 295 ("[T]he variance in practice has been widely
used as a device for much broader zoning flexibility.").
247. See Delaney, supra note 45, at 170-76 (describing recent policies that would limit
the construction of new affordable workforce housing in various states, and the debates
surrounding such policies).
248. See, e.g., McIlwain, supra note 4, at 30-31 (describing the increasing number of
workforce families with critical housing needs).
249. See id. at 31; The Sun Also Sets, supra note 17, at 67 (arguing that property values
are presently severely overinflated: "since the mid-1990s prices have increased more than
twice as much ... as in the 1970s or 1980s"). Critics argue that the United States fails to
recognize the distorted housing market by maintaining that "a national housing bubble is
highly unlikely because prices are determined largely by local factors" in spite of the fact
that a study of the housing market concluded that "home prices look overvalued in 20
states that account for over half America's population." Id. at 68.
250. See Owens, supra note 159, at 315. Individually, such exceptions to zoning
requirements seem insignificant. Id. ("[Rielatively modest adjustments to setback
requirements . . . [are] hardly likely to shake the foundations upon which the ordinances
are based."). However, their collective impact undermines the success achieved by other
affordable housing schemes by providing developers with a means to mansionize
neighborhoods. See Annie Gowen, A Large-Scale Disagreement: As Massive Houses
Prompt Protests, Arlington Proposes Limits, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2005, at Al (describing
proposed changes to zoning regulations that attempt to preclude suburban
mansionization); Fighting Monster Homes, supra note 178 (linking mansionization with
decreased availability of more affordable starter homes). Proposed changes to zoning
regulations would be ineffective given the current procedures for granting area variances.
See supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
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close-in suburbs-of tearing down older homes and building million-
dollar edifices in their place, often squeezed onto tiny lots.
251
Mansionization will often require a deviation from the minimum set-back
252
requirements or height requirements established by zoning regulations.
The cumulative significance of improperly granting individual exceptions
to zoning regulations that permit mansionization is considerable because
it could unsystematically and permanently alter the character of a mixed-
income community. 5 First, demolishing an existing small or moderately
sized home eliminates it altogether from the market. Second, first-time• 254
home owners are unable to afford its replacement -a giant-sized,
expensive home, commonly referred to as a "McMansion" or "Monster
Home., 255 Third, once mansionization catches on, developers with deep
pockets can drive up the values of the surrounding properties, pricing
workforce families and first-time homeowners out of the neighborhood
256
completely. Moreover, opportunity and incentive to challenge area
variances are minimal for those who are most adversely affected by thesed •• 257
decisions. This is because they either lack legal resources and
21knowledge, 58 or, in the case of future residents, because they are simply
not in a position to challenge the decisions.9 Therefore, courts never
260
review most variance grants.
251. Gowen, supra note 26.
252. See id. (reporting that proposals that would restrict this practice in order to
specifically target mansionization are receiving more attention); Gowen, supra note 250
(discussing proposals to amend zoning regulations in order to reduce height and set-back
requirements in Arlington, Virginia). Such proposals would likely encourage developers
to apply for variances to carry out their prerogative of mansionizing their property despite
the zoning restrictions. Cf supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
253. Cf Owens, supra note 159, at 295-99.
254. Fighting Monster Homes, supra note 178.
255. Gowen, supra note 26; see also Fighting Monster Homes, supra note 178
(reporting that "[h]ome sizes have swelled 40 percent since the early '70s").
256. See Fighting Monster Homes, supra note 178; see also The Kojo Nnamdi Show:
Zoning, Development & Supersized Homes (WAMU 88.5FM radio broadcast Aug.
15, 2005), available at http://www.wamu.org/programs/kn/05/08/15.php [hereinafter
Supersized Homes].
257. See Reynolds, supra note 177, at 139-40 (suggesting that the lack of judicial review
of most variance grants may be the reason for the inconsistency between "theory and
practice in this area of the law").
258. Id. at 139.
259. See Iglesias, supra note 16, at 461; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504, 508
(1975) (discussing standing requirements for third parties in zoning actions).
260. See Owens, supra note 159, at 316 (noting that "[mjost variance decisions are not
appealed [in] court," but when they are, "the most common result is that the board's
decision is affirmed" and citing a recent study of variances that found only two and one-
half percent of variance denials were appealed in court).
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The abuse of the zoning variance has long been considered a weakness
261
of zoning. It is especially troublesome where it undermines precisely
what current planning efforts are designed to solve . 62 Demolishing and
rebuilding a residential unit has traditionally been within the right to
reasonably use one's property.63 It can even increase surrounding
264property values, resulting in a windfall benefit to the other owners.
Courts have impliedly acknowledged both of these propositions by
relaxing the requirements for granting area variances that permit
mansionization. Among the many complaints about mansionization,
neighbors claim that the new McMansions are an eyesore and "built right
266
to the lot line," infringing on privacy. But, more significantly, given the
present affordable housing shortage, replacing a modest starter home
with one that is unaffordable to the vast majority, and thereby increasing
the surrounding property values, prices workforce families and first-time
homeowners out of the neighborhood. Thus, mansionization, through
269
the abuse of the area variance, undermines inclusionary efforts.
V. AFFORDABLE HOUSING STRATEGIES SHOULD RESTRICT LOCAL
DISCRETION OVER GRANTING AREA VARIANCES
Given that area variances are the most commonly requested
variances,27 ° the ease with which they are granted, 71 and the lack of state
or judicial control over the zoning authorities that grant them,272
controlling area variances should play a more significant role in
affordable housing strategy. Fair share principles should apply when an
exception to a zoning regulation is requested, just as they do when zoning
261. See id. 280-81 (quoting Judge Benjamin Cardozo: "Itlhere has been confided to
the [zoning] board a delicate jurisdiction and one easily abused. Upon a showing of
unnecessary hardship, general rules are suspended for the benefit of individual owners and
special privileges established.").
262. See id.
263. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (recognizing the
right to build on one's own land); Supersized Homes, supra note 256.
264. See Fighting Monster Homes, supra note 178.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 175-77.
266. Fighting Monster Homes, supra note 178; see also Supersized Homes, supra note
256.
267. See discussion supra notes 1-13, 250 and accompanying text.
268. See Fighting Monster Homes, supra note 178.
269. Cf Owens, supra note 159, at 319.
270. See id. at 310.
271. See id. at 303, 309.
272. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
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regulations are merely being enforced or challenged.273  Like a new
development proposal or a zoning regulation, a proposed variance may
dramatically affect existing residential property values, especially in the
case of a mansionization proposal.274  Imposing additional substantiveand pocedual " 275
and procedural requirements for obtaining an area variance would
ensure that mansionization does not undermine affordable workforcee- 271
housing efforts. Ideally, such additional requirements should
simultaneously encourage fair share principles and new investment into
277the community.
A determination of what additional requirements are appropriate,
should borrow from the strategies that have had the most success inS • 278
providing affordable workforce housing, and from those proposed
strategies that show the most promise. 9 States and localities have
implemented suggestions that successfully incorporate fair-share
principles into large-scale new development. 280 They should extend
proactive and reactive strategies, as well as the proposals for hybrid
approaches that balance regionalism with localism, to the house-by-
house redevelopment of existing neighborhoods.2 1  Any request for an
area variance should trigger a careful analysis of the economic
exclusionary impact of the proposed variance, and a consideration of the
housing needs of both the community and the region.2
According to courts that have presided over variance grants, local
authorities should, as a matter of course, strictly limit an owner's ability
273. See Owens, supra note 159, at 319 ("[A]II individual petitions [for variances]
should incorporate consideration of the impacts of the [proposal] on community
interests.").
274. See, e.g., Supersized Homes, supra note 256 (partly attributing rapidly rising
property values to the high price can, and will, pay for lots on which they can build
monster homes with high resale values).
275. See, e.g., News Release, Howard Denis, Councilmember, Montgomery County,
Md., Council, Denis Statement on his Legislation to Address "Mansionization" In County,
(Nov. 26, 2003), http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/content/council/2003news/1126
hdmansion.pdf (arguing for additional requirements and specificity before allowing
exceptions to height requirements).
276. Cf. Gowen, supra note 250 (reporting proposed changes to existing zoning
requirements). Merely imposing new zoning requirements, such as floor to area ratios
(FAR), would not suffice without an amendment to the variance procedure because
obtaining variances from the new regulations would be just as easy as obtaining them from
existing regulations. See discussion supra Part III.
277. Cf. Fighting Monster Homes, supra note 178.
278. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
279. See supra notes 229,231-32 and accompanying text.
280. See discussion supra Parts IV.A-.B.
281. See discussion supra Parts IV.A-.B (describing these strategies and proposals).
282. See Iglesias, supra note 16, at 478-79; Owens, supra note 159, at 319.
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2831to deviate from zoning regulations. In theory, zoning regulations-
which are a proper exercise of police power-either already restrict a
property-owner's right to build up his tract, or will soon restrict that right
as mansionization attracts more attention and as communities pass
284stricter zoning laws. Incorporating fair share principles into the
variance process would place no further limit on an owner's legal right to
build up his property. Rather, where he is already prevented by law from
doing so, using the fair-share doctrine as a factor in determining whether
he deserves a variance would simply help limit the use of variances to the
rare circumstances for which they were intended-when depriving an
285
owner of variance would amount to a regulatory taking.
VI. CONCLUSION
Local variance procedure should incorporate both the trend toward
state and judicial scrutiny of local zoning decisions, and the trend toward
a more active state role in directing local governments' zoning policies
while respecting localism. The collective impact of improperly granting
area variances, where the decisions are made solely based on fiscal
considerations without regard to fair share principles, is to overinflate
property values, price workforce families out of communities, and
undermine the nationwide legal trend toward inclusionary practices. A
property owner's request for an area variance should trigger additional
procedural and substantive requirements. Such requirements should
implement strategies that have successfully provided affordable
workforce housing around the nation, as well as proposed strategies that
show promise. Without extending the fair-share doctrine to variance
procedure, mansionization of inner suburbs will continue to exclude
workforce families from the communities in which they work.
283. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
284. See Gowen, supra note 250; supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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